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Introduction 
There is a huge literature relevant to exploring aspects of the 
interrelationships between nationalism and warfare, but there are few 
systematic accounts of these linkages. John Hall and Sinisa Malešević 
provide an excellent overview in the introduction to their edited 
collection.1 A significant problem is the complexity of delimiting what we 
mean by warfare. Miguel Centeno defines war as ‘a substantial armed 
conflict between organized military forces of independent political units’.2 
This is only a start since wars can be interstate, intrastate, imperial and 
liberation in character. They also vary enormously in their military 
organisation and in the range of sectors mobilised, which in the case of 
‘total wars’ may include much of society. ‘Warfare’ can refer also to peace-
time institutional initiatives and practices related to military 
preparedness. ‘War’ can also be a retrospective label placed on a series of 
disparate events. Related to this, the myths of war in this case may be as 
significant for collectivities as ‘objective’ experiences. 
Defining nationalism too can be problematic: it can encompass both 
national sentiment and ideology (the latter largely a post eighteenth-
century phenomenon), and it is necessary also to include its referents, the 
nation and the nation state. For the purposes of this review, I will focus on 
five main issues. These are, first, connections between European military 
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revolutions and nation state formation; second, the role of war 
memorialisation in the ‘sacralisation’ of national communities; third, the 
impact of total war in the transition from a world of empires to one of 
nation states; fourth, the alleged denationalising effects of contemporary 
warfare; and, finally, the ‘war proneness’ of nationalism. These issues are 
further explored in John Hutchinson.3 
The military revolution and the rise of the nation state 
Charles Tilly and Michael Mann offer the most systematic account of the 
role of war in the genesis of the modern nation state.4 Here ‘state’ is 
defined in modified Weberian terms to refer to the control (if not 
monopoly) of legitimate violence over a territory. Tilly argues the modern 
nation state is a by-product of rulers’ efforts to acquire the means of war 
and war is an organisational phenomenon from which the state derived its 
administrative machinery. The two are mutually re-enforcing, as 
summarised in Tilly’s dictum ‘war made states and states made war’. The 
setting is post-Roman Europe, a multi-actor civilisation of heterogeneous 
political units (empires, city-states, dynastic kingdoms) whose major 
polities fought to become an imperial hegemon. Both scholars draw on the 
substantial historiography on the European ‘military revolution’ of the 
early modern era, which resulted in new technologies, tactics and 
strategies, and a rapid increase in the size of armies relative to the 
population. 
Tilly argues this favoured centralised political administrations able to levy 
taxes and raise large permanent armies and draw on revenues derived 
from trade and commercialised agriculture. Kingdoms such as England 
and France rose in strength in relation to city-states and (over time) 
agrarian empires, and their rulers could use standing armies to quell 
internal challenges to their rule. Such units became the prototypes of the 
nation state. State centralising pressures and recurrent wars encouraged a 
growing identification with the territory of the state rather than just one’s 
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locality, resulting in a growing national consciousness. When populations 
revolted against state exactions, they staged national rather than local 
revolts. A decisive moment was the French revolution, which in 
transforming a dynastic into a people’s state created the nation state 
model. The military power of the nation state drawing on the energies of 
its whole population ensured its universal diffusion. 
In Tilly’s account nationalism and the nation state are largely late 
derivatives of state-induced territorial consolidation. Mann is more 
nuanced in acknowledging the existence of proto-national loyalties from 
the time of the Reformation onwards, but argues that these have little 
organisational significance in themselves: it is only when they become 
fused with the horizontal politics of citizenship (during the French 
Revolution) that we get modern nationalism. He also relates nation state 
to class formation: the nation state forms from the increasing impress of 
the late-eighteenth-century state (via taxes and conscription) on the new 
social classes emerging from industrial capitalism. This produces political 
movements demanding representation in the state. Nationalism originates 
as a drive for democracy. In the course of the struggle for power both the 
bourgeoisie and working class come to identify with (or are caged within) 
the state, as the nation state. 
These accounts have been criticised as Eurocentric by Miguel Centeno, 
who argues that the military-fiscal-extraction system does not apply to 
states in Latin America, and by extension post-colonial Africa, which rarely 
went to war with each other and which could finance their spending by 
access to overseas loans or foreign aid.5 Intrastate rather than interstate 
war predominated. John Hutchinson, drawing on medieval historians, 
maintains that both statehood and a sense of nationality – invoked in the 
Hundred Years War between England and France – preceded the military 
revolution, and we need a much more interactive relationship between 
nationalism, war and state formation. 6  War, although capable of 
accelerating state formation, also destroyed states. He explores how a 
sense of nationality could both underpin and undermine effective state 
development. Philip Gorski claims that a programmatic nationalism, often 
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infused with religious motifs, crystallised in the wars of the Reformation 
and Counter Reformation, notably in the Dutch Revolt out of which the 
Netherlands formed.7 
Michael Howard provides a succinct guide to how nationalism 
transformed the practices of war by applying the concept of the citizen in 
arms.8 There is a related scholarship linking war or military pressures to 
the development of national democratic citizenship. Barry Posen 
emphasises the central role of universal conscription (in conjunction with 
general education systems) in nationalising populations (the people in 
arms), but as Jorn Leonhard shows conscription was only one among 
many military practices and could provoke popular resistance.9 Mann, we 
observed, argues that such resistance itself generated a democratic 
politics for control of the state. Arthur Marwick examined the twentieth-
century industrial wars which required a total mobilisation of the 
population as accelerators of mass democracy, but such intense 
politicisation could also throw up totalitarian models of the nation state in 
Fascism.10 
Warfare and the sacralisation of nations 
A second focus is on the nation as a moral community which might be in 
tension with the nation state. There are several ways in which warfare 
may contribute to national (re-) formation, explored in particular by 
ethnosymbolic approaches.11 First, wars may generate myths around 
climactic events whose narratives endow populations with a sense of 
meaning and unique destiny. John Armstrong has examined how polities 
and/or populations in the struggles between Christians and Muslims led to 
particular polities and their populations defining themselves as border 
guards of their civilisations.12 Second, Anthony Smith discusses how 
recurring dyadic wars with neighbours may produce ‘we-they’ ethnic 
stereotypes in state propaganda that result in collective self-
differentiation.13 Third, the intense emotions generated in war have given 
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rise to public rituals that in turn produce a sense of in-group commonality. 
George Mosse pioneered the study of great national commemorative 
festivals, including those devoted to the myth of the fallen soldier, as a 
form of surrogate religion.14 In Durkheimian terms, such commemorations 
created a cult around the remembrance of the dead, which functioned to 
renew social cohesion, committing survivors in honour of the dead to 
commit to the (national) values for which they sacrificed. This has fed into 
ethnosymbolic accounts of nation formation of Smith and Hutchinson.15 
Fourth, the outcomes of war, both of victory and defeat, shape nation 
formation. Victory especially in liberation wars may be said to canonise a 
revolutionary generation, but arguably defeat has more radicalising 
potential since in the era of nationalism it can be seen represent a failure 
of the people, itself.16 This can lead to demands for a thorough moral and 
socio-political transformation of existing institutions, including a search 
for scapegoats that may include ‘corrupt’ governing classes or the 
scapegoating of minorities.17 
All four of these factors can embed memories of war in the everyday 
culture of the society. This is an important but relatively underexplored 
topic.18 A related topic concerns the question of individual’s motivation to 
fight in wars and the role nationalism plays in this. Some authors see 
nationalist ideology as particularly potent ideological device for mass 
mobilisation whereas others are more sceptical.19 
Sceptics have argued that ethnosymbolic approaches exaggerate the long-
term nation-forming significance of war commemoration in the absence of 
evidence of how they are received, and that attempts to impose hegemonic 
narratives often result in cultural contestation, which can (depending on 
context) result in civil wars or a pluralisation of national identities.20 
However, it could be argued that such contestation leads to a process of 
nationalisation as outgroups compete to be recognised in national terms. 
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War and the transition from empires to nation states 
A third topic is the role of war in the transition from a world of empires to 
one of nation states. If in Western Europe the nation states emerged 
through recurring interstate wars over centuries, the majority of the 
world’s nation states came into being through a different route in the 
twentieth century, suddenly and in successive waves, via imperial 
dissolution in World Wars or subsequent geo-political exhaustion.  
This has been relatively underexplored. Andreas Wimme, supported by a 
large statistical study, argues that nationalist ideology is the direct cause 
of imperial dissolution in ‘waves of war’.21 He discounts as secondary geo-
political factors. Nationalist liberation wars fought in other parts of the 
empire increased the probability of nation state creation, and the more 
territories that succeed in seceding to form nation states, the more likely 
that the remaining territories would go the same route. As new nation 
states formed with messy boundaries and with their own minorities, 
armed secessionist movements emerged, while many of these states 
engaged in irredentist campaigns. 
In spite of his insights, Wimmer insufficiently emphasises how nationalist 
military revolutions in the nineteenth century shifted the balance power 
between nation states and dynastic empires, how the ideology of 
nationalism challenged imperial practices of war making, and how the 
processes of World War (which were total wars) radicalised national 
minorities. This is a complex topic since in the modern world there have 
been many kinds of empires, in which there was a hybridisation with 
national principles. There were the dynastic continental empires, such as 
the Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which produced 
nationalising projects, expanding nation-state overseas empires where 
homeland nationalism was in tension with imperialist civilising missions, 
and the USSR which domesticated principles of self-determination within 
ideoctatic principles.22 The challenges of war and military geo-political 
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competition produced distinctive problems to each imperial form but 
certain general patterns emerge. 
Cynthia Enloe discusses how nation-state models of universal conscription 
proved problematic for empires employing ‘martial races’ strategies of co-
opting specific ethnic groups.23 Aviel Roshwald shows how the leaders of 
national minorities in Central Europe were able to exploit the passions 
and chaos of total war to achieve independence.24 This was also the case 
for Asian nationalist elites in the nation-state overseas empires during the 
Second World War when the victories Japanese armies shattered 
European authority and the collaborative networks, on which their power 
largely rested.25 Karma Nabulsi and Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron 
have also analysed the rise and transmission of guerrilla and popular 
insurrectionary traditions and techniques and their efficacy against 
imperial powers.26 
Tilly claims a formative role for the treaties at the end of major wars at 
which the victors established rules of the subsequent world order.27 This 
is pertinent to the end of both World Wars, most strikingly after the First 
World War when Woodrow Wilson sought to impose the principles of 
national self-determination to reconstruct Central and Eastern Europe. 
Arguably, it was the resistance to such treaties by the vanquished that is 
most striking. 
Imperial dissolution had very varied consequences, which, with some 
exceptions, has had too little treatment.28 What Aviel Roshvald argues with 
respect to the First World War applies also to its successor: that war and 
its aftermath catapulted nationalist movements into positions of authority 
before the necessary cultural and institutional framework was able to 
develop.29 In general, the rapidity of imperial disintegration, often an 
indirect effect of war, meant the coming into existence of insecure and 
unstable political units that have provoked recurring attempts of re-
imperialisation. As John Darwin has argued the era of empires has not 
ended, but rather taken new ‘informal’ characteristics. Mark Beissinger 
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even suggests that the interstate system has imperial characteristics: the 
norms of state sovereignty and restrictions of self-determination to state 
territorial units constitute a form of coercive rule by established states 
that deny the rights of stateless nations.30 
Nationalism and contemporary war  
A fourth issue is whether we have moved into a post-national global era, in 
which interstate war between advanced states is curbed by the UN Charter 
and inhibited by spread of weapons of mass destruction, whereas there is 
a proliferation of ‘new’ intrastate wars in postcolonial states. Is the nexus 
between warfare and nation formation diminishing? There are several 
interrelated topics. 
First, in the West, it is argued, since 1945 nationalism has been associated 
with destructive world war and genocide. This has led to global and 
regional initiatives, the establishment of the UN and the European Union 
respectively, to replace the realpolitik of nation states. Bernhard Giesen 
maintains Europe is pioneering solutions to conflict not in war but in a 
politics of restitution and reconciliation.31 
Second, Michael Howard and Anthony King have examined the impact of 
transnational military revolutions that have produced a shift from mass 
conscription to professional militaries and a civilianisation of society in 
the developed West.32 Howard argues that the rise of high-precision 
technologies and nuclear weaponry has made obsolete conscription 
armies with the result that nationalism is no longer required as a 
mobilising ideology. In addition, Luttwak maintains declining fertility in 
the West has alleged led to a casualty aversion and a consequent suspicion 
of military adventures.33 
Third, Western powers continue to military intervene in conflict zones. 
However, these are now justified as ‘peace-keeping’ interventions under 
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United Nations rather than national mandates and are characterised as 
‘risk transfer wars’.34 As interstate war between advanced polities has 
declined, ‘new’ intrastate wars, enabled by global processes such as the 
arms trade, proliferate in post-colonial countries that fragment the 
possibilities of collective identities, Mary Kaldor argues that nationalism is 
increasingly irrelevant and looks to a cosmopolitan politics as an 
alternative.35 
Finally, too, many analysts propose that in a post-imperial world and post-
Holocaust world there is growing suspicion of the military narratives of 
Western nation states and an awareness of the victims of war, that erodes 
the heroic ethos on which collective sacrifice for the nation depends. 
Anthony King, among others, has suggested that the language of national 
sacrifice no longer sacralises the military dead in the West who are 
portrayed instead in terms of their qualities as individuals and their 
exemplary professionalism.36 
While these arguments have some force, a recent collection edited by 
Sibylle Scheipers indicates they reflect a West European perspective and 
nationalism and military commitment remain strong in many areas of the 
world.37 Casualty aversion is related to the legitimacy of specific wars, not 
of war itself. Even far-distant humanitarian ‘wars of choice’, though 
justified by universal mandates, are ultimately sustained by coalitions of 
nation states and may re-inforce a sense of national allegiance. Outside the 
West, many of the ‘new wars’ are far from novel in their features and 
contribute to nation and state formation. 38  Finally, although 
commemoration of the war dead is contested and is more individualistic in 
its expression, it relies on repertoire and practices that are embedded in 
everyday life and the frameworks provided by ‘sacred’ ceremonial 
occasions, whose resonance remains as potent as ever. 
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Nationalism as ‘war prone’ 
It is a popular assumption that nationalism is bellicose, and one supported 
by several traditions of scholars of nationalism. In a study of the USA 
Caroline Marvin and Derek Ingle make the general claim that national 
solidarity and reproduction is dependent on regular cycles of interstate 
war.39 War diverts the violent instincts of society (embodied in young 
males) outwards to external ‘others’, and the martial young die to become 
martyrs whose cult binds survivors to national values. Commemorative 
rituals also function to prepare young men for future martial service. 
Although powerful, this has problems with the existence of many pacific 
nations. 
A second perspective, reflected in Elie Kedourie, views nationalism as a 
millenarian politics that is radically subversive of all established 
arrangements domestic and international, not sanctioned by the people, 
leading inevitably to war.40 Its justification of claims (to territory and 
populations) by reference to historical mythologies makes the resolution 
of differences intractable. This critique, while having some force, fails to 
acknowledge the varieties of nationalism, some of which are compatible 
with conservative and liberal constitutional politics. It rather ignores the 
fact that the centuries before modern nationalism were of incessant 
confessional and dynastic conflict. 
A third tradition, represented by Andreas Wimmer, considers both 
nationalism and nation states are ‘war-prone’ arising from the bellicose 
origins of modern state, identified by Tilly.41 The nation state is a compact 
between martial elites and masses who are offered public goods in return 
for military service and taxes. A difficulty with this approach is that in the 
era of nationalism interstate wars have declined and military spendings 
have declined as a proportion of state expenditures. Moreover, nation 
states have sponsored the growth of international law and the 
establishment of transnational organisations to limit war-making. 
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A final perspective, strongly reflected in international relations literature 
considers the proliferation of intra-state war as a product of the 
contradictions between ideas of state sovereignty and the ideology of 
national self-determination.42 While secessionist and irredentist claims 
continue to present a problem to the international system, it could be 
argued that in many parts of the world violent disorders arise from an 
absence of national solidarities, and that coalitions of nation states remain 
as essential mechanisms through which a stable order can be maintained. 
Each of these critiques then has force, but they are one-sided. Nationalism 
can be seen as both a principle of order and disorder, suggesting that 
contingent factors have to be brought into play to explain outburst of 
violence. 
This review is part of 
The State of Nationalism (SoN), a comprehensive guide 
to the study of nationalism. 
As such it is also published on the SoN website, 
where it is combined with an annotated bibliography 
and where it will be regularly updated. 
SoN is jointly supported by two institutes: 
NISE and the University of East London (UEL). 
Dr Eric Taylor Woods and Dr Robert Schertzer 
are responsible for overall management 
and co-editors-in-chief. 
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